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This paper focuses on WPA and IEEE 802.11i protocols that represent two important solutions in the wireless environment. Sce-
narios where it is possible to produce a DoS attack and DoS flooding attacks are outlined. The last phase of the authentication
process, represented by the 4-way handshake procedure, is shown to be unsafe from DoS attack. This can produce the undesired
eﬀect of memory exhaustion if a flooding DoS attack is conducted. In order to avoid DoS attack without increasing the complexity
of wireless mobile devices too much and without changing through some further control fields of the frame structure of wireless
security protocols, a solution is found and an extension of WPA and IEEE 802.11 is proposed. A protocol extension with three
“static” variants and with a resource-aware dynamic approach is considered. The three enhancements to the standard protocols
are achieved through some simple changes on the client side and they are robust against DoS and DoS flooding attack. Advantages
introduced by the proposal are validated by simulation campaigns and simulation parameters such as attempted attacks, success-
ful attacks, and CPU load, while the algorithm execution time is evaluated. Simulation results show how the three static solutions
avoid memory exhaustion and present a good performance in terms of CPU load and execution time in comparison with the stan-
dard WPA and IEEE 802.11i protocols. However, if the mobile device presents diﬀerent resource availability in terms of CPU and
memory or if resource availability significantly changes in time, a dynamic approach that is able to switch among three diﬀerent
modalities could be more suitable.
Copyright © 2006 Floriano De Rango et al. This is an open access article distributed under the Creative Commons Attribution
License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly
cited.
1. INTRODUCTION
One of the greatest challenges to any organisation is secur-
ing its data against unauthorised access, particularly those
organisations that use wireless network technologies to man-
age information.
Wireless networks oﬀer organisations and user benefits
such as portability, flexibility, increased productivity, and
lower installation costs. However, risks are inherent in any
technology. Some of the wireless risks are similar to those of
wired networks, some are exacerbated, and some are new.
The most significant source of risks in wireless networks
is the use of radio waves to transmit data. Radio waves move
through the air and can be intercepted by any attacker with
the appropriate equipment.
Security measures prevent and reduce the risk of unau-
thorised access into wireless network resources. On the other
hand, these measures can reduce productivity, by creating
additional processes and work.
In this context an extension to the authentication phase
of Wi-Fi protected access (WPA) [1–5] and IEEE 802.11i
[6, 7] is proposed in this paper. WPA and IEEE 802.11i repre-
sent, until now, two important solutions to security issues in
wireless networks and they have been considered in our anal-
ysis. Some particular risk scenarios, where the 4-way hand-
shake of the authentication phase of these two protocols can
fail, is analysed. Specifically, we consider a previously pro-
posed solution published in [8, 9] (solution I) but simula-
tion results are added and more implementation details are
provided. Then, a second solution (solution II), suggested
but not tested by He and Mitchell, is also considered, and
a third novel solution that tries to release memory at the mo-
bile device is also investigated and compared with the pre-
vious solutions. Because these solutions are prefixed at the
terminal, they are called static. These extensions to the stan-
dard protocols need just a few operations on the client side
without introducing additional fields in the WPA and IEEE
802.11i protocol frame format. This permits the standard
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protocols to be used and to avoid the possible issues of DoS
attacks. Simulation results show the benefits introduced by
these static solutions in terms of CPU and memory load.
However, as experienced by simulation results, the best solu-
tion does not exist if one of these static approaches are used
because mobile-devices can present diﬀerent characteristics
and resource availability. Thus, a dynamic resource-oriented
approach is proposed (solution IV). This approach tries to
take full advantage of the single solutions through a dynamic
thresholds mechanism that is able to switch among the three
previously analysed solutions. In order to implement this
mechanism, just some modifications to the mobile device
need to be performed such as a monitoring software that is
able to account for the current CPU and memory load and a
switching center that permits the 4-way handshake messages
exchange modality to be changed in accordance with solu-
tions I, II, and III.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents a
brief overview of the work related to the security of wire-
less LAN; WPA and IEEE 802.11i are presented in Section 3;
the 4-way handshake is introduced in Section 4; Section 5
presents some DoS and DoS flooding attack scenario dur-
ing the 4-way handshake phase of the WPA/IEEE 802.11i;
in Section 6 three static solutions to avoid DoS attacks are
presented (two of them have been qualitatively and without
simulations considered in [8, 9]) and a fourth dynamic so-
lution is proposed; FSA modelling is reported in Section 7;
Section 8 presents the simulation results; finally the conclu-
sions are summarised in the last section.
2. RELATED WORK
In the last few years the attention of industry and the aca-
demic world has been focused on security protocols over
wireless networks and specifically on WLAN. A lot of au-
thentication protocols, in particular EAP (extension access
protocol), such as transport layer security (TLS), MD5, tun-
nelled TLS (TTLS), light extensive access protocol (LEAP),
protected EAP (PEAP), SecureID, SIM, GTC, and AKA have
been proposed in the literature [10].
In order to oﬀer data confidentiality equivalent to a wired
network, the IEEE 802.11 standard [11] defined wired equiv-
alent privacy (WEP). However, numerous researchers have
shown that none of the data confidentiality, integrity, and au-
thentication could be achieved through the intrinsic mecha-
nism of this protocol [7, 12].
WEP is based on a cryptography system that was alleged
to oﬀer privacy, authentication, and integrity.
A secret key K of 40 bits is shared by APs and clients of
the wireless network and it is queued at an initialisation vec-
tor (IV) of 24 bits. The string, obtained by this process, is
encrypted by RC4 in order to obtain the encoding key (key
stream) of messages in clear.
The authentication process is only one-way (client-side).
This means that only the client needs to be authenticated by
the AP and not vice versa. This behaviour does not give guar-
antees about the network that the client is referring to.
WEP uses the RC4 algorithm that is well known to be un-
safe if the same keys are used several times in it. The initialisa-
tion vector, applied to the RC4, is 24 bits and this determines
the repetition of the keys after a while permitting a known-
plaintext attack [13]. A further characteristics of WEP is the
restarting of VI (or IV) if a packet collision occurs.
Another issue of WEP protocol is the manual distribu-
tion of keys over all AP stations. In this key management
scheme, all clients of the same basic service set (BSS) use the
same key, thereby reducing the privacy of the other users.
The authentication phase is not very safe because it
makes use of the same key as the encryption in input to
RC4 to authenticate the client. Another bad use of the
mechanisms in WEP protocol is the integrity check through
the CRC-32 algorithm. Cyclic redundancy check (CRC) is a
noncryptographic function f that has the linearity property.
This means that the function f is linear if f (a)XOR f (b) =
f (aXORb). Details of CRC techniques can be found in [4].
This linearity property can be used by the hackers to vio-
late the integrity of packets.
All these security issues were analysed by the inter-
net security, applications, authentication, and cryptography
(ISAAC) of University of California and then, by three people
(Fhurer et al.) in a famous paper [14]. The failure of WEP is
due to the choice of the project managers in the security ar-
chitecture deployment.
Although WEP fails to satisfy any security requirements,
it is not practical to anticipate users to completely discard
their devices with WEP already implemented. Hence, Wi-
Fi alliance proposed interim solution, called protected ac-
cess (WPA), to ameliorate the vulnerabilities by reusing the
legacy hardware. WPA adopts a temporal key integrity pro-
tocol (TKIP) for data confidentiality and the Michael algo-
rithm, a weak keyed message integrity code (MIC), for im-
proved data integrity under the limitation of the computa-
tion power available in the devices. Moreover, in order to
detect replayed packets, WPA implements a packet sequenc-
ing mechanism by binding a monotonically increasing se-
quence number to each packet. In addition, WPA provides
two improved authentication mechanisms. For more details
about WPA, see [1]. Despite these security enhancements
of WPA, a weakness is predestined since WPA appears ow-
ing to the limitations of reusing the legacy hardware. Al-
though TKIP key-mixing function has stronger security than
WEP key-scheduling algorithm, it is not so strong as ex-
pected [15]. Moreover, Michael algorithm is designed to pro-
vide only 20 bits (or possibly slightly more) of security in
order to minimise the impact on the performance, which
means an adversary can construct one successful forgery ev-
ery 219 packets. Some countermeasures have been adopted
[6]. However these countermeasures may allow DoS and
DoS flooding attacks. In addition, the 802.1X authentica-
tion may be vulnerable to session hijacking and man-in-the-
middle (MitM) attacks [2]. In order to provide an enhanced
MAC layer security, IEEE 802.11i was proposed [6]. Un-
der the assumption of upgrading the hardware, 802.11i de-
fines a countermode/CBC-MAC protocol (CCMP) that pro-
vides strong confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection
[16]. Moreover, an authentication process, combining the
802.1X authentication and key management procedures, is
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Table 1: Comparison of WEP, WPA, and IEEE802.11i features.
WEP WPA IEEE 802.11i
Encryption algorithm RC4 RC4 (TKIP) AES-128
Key length 40 bit 128 bit 128-192-256 bit
IV length 24 bit 48 bit 48 bit
Authentication Only client Mutual Mutual
Integrity CRC MIC CCM-MIC
Key type Static Dynamic Dynamic
Key distribution Manual Dynamic Dynamic
HW compatibility Easy Easy Diﬃcult
performed to mutually authenticate the devices and generate
a fresh session key for data transmissions. However, also the
IEEE 802.11i can present some weakness to possible DoS at-
tacks such as shown by the authors in [8, 9]. This paper start-
ing from the He and Mitchell’s work focuses on the 4-way
handshake procedure giving some implementation guide to
simulate the DoS attacks on the WLAN networks and show-
ing the performance degradations when DoS or DoS flood-
ing attacks are led to the mobile devices. Moreover, a variant
with memory release and a dynamic approach that tries to
combine the diﬀerent solutions analysed in this paper is pro-
posed. In the following a brief overview of WPA and IEEE
802.11i and 4-way handshake will be given.
3. OVERVIEW OF WPA AND IEEE 802.11i
When the security bugs of WEP were outlined, it was clear
that the big issue was to find a right solution to the security
in a short time as possible.
Wi-Fi alliance and the IEEE 802.11i agree with the need
to develop a novel standard, able to overcome all the security
bugs. This standard was the IEEE 802.11i [6]. However, this
novel protocol would have caused an incompatibility with
200 million wireless devices around the world. Thus in order
to resolveWEP bugs and to oﬀer backward compatibility and
a migration toward the IEEE 802.11i, the Wi-Fi protected ac-
cess (WPA) has been proposed. Even if in June 2004 the more
complete IEEE 802.11i was released; WPA represents till now
the most used security standard. It resolves WEP bugs and
oﬀers a light-weight transition toward more complex secu-
rity protocol such as 802.11i.
WPA arose as a solution to WEP inconsistency and it is
considered one of the best security dynamic protocols; the
novel standard IEEE 802.11i is also called WPA2 [16].
Diﬀerently from the WEP, Wi-Fi protected access (WPA)
implements a set of functions called robust security network
association (RSNA) that oﬀers a greater security level, au-
thentication, and integrity check functions.
For data encryption, WPA uses the default temporary key
integrity protocol (TKIP), maintaining backward compatibil-
ity through further WEP support.
TKIP makes four distinct enhancements to WEP
(Table 1). Firstly, it increases the IV size from 24 to 48 bits,
meaning that key reuse is no longer a worry. Secondly, it












Figure 1: Supplicant, authenticator, and authentication server in
IEEE802.1X/EAP.
avoid replay. Thirdly, it mixes the sequence number and
transmits the address with the WEP base key to derive a per-
frame key. Finally, it includes a message authentication code
(MIC) of the source and destination addresses, the priority,
and the plaintext data, to allow forgeries to be detected.
Regarding the authentication phase, WPA has its strong
point in the 802.1X/EAP architecture that oﬀers mutual au-
thentication between the AP and the client, the negotiation
of the authentication scheme and dynamic key distribution
(this avoids the manual configuration of the static key).
The 802.1X architecture provides three entities involved
in the communication: the supplicant (S) that represents the
client or the peer that asks for network access; the authen-
ticator (A) that is the AP that oﬀers the access service; the
authentication server (AS) that is represented by the server
that realises the authentication and the authorization phases
toward the client such as remote authentication dial in user
service (RADIUS), and DIAMETER [17, 18] (see Figure 1).
However, WPA permits the use, alternatively to the stan-
dard authenticationmode with 802.1X/EAP, of the preshared
key (PSK) mode. This modality defines a preconfiguration
of the secret key, set manually or through other agreements
on devices, that had been introduced by WPA (and main-
tained in 802.11i) in order to permit its use in small oﬃce
home-based networks (SOHO) environment and in overall
environments where it is not possible to use a structured and
hierarchical structure such as RADIUS [17].
Three logically distinct subphases can be observed inside




In this work attention will be focused on the 4-way handshake
phase.
The 4-way handshake is preceded by an EAP procedure.
Even if the EAP procedure is not an eﬀective part of 802.11i,
we mention it for completeness. We refer, for example, to
EAP-TLS procedure. At the end of the EAP-TLS handshake,
the supplicant encrypts a premaster key with the public key
of server (this key is communicated by the server to the client
during the TLS-handshake) and sends it to server, which can
decrypt the message with its private key. In this way, suppli-
cant and server share the premaster key. Starting from this
last knowledge, the pairwise master key (PMK) can be de-
rived in the same time on both the client and the server, ap-
plying a specific cryptography function called pseudorandom
function (PRF). At this point, the server will transfer its own
PMK through a RADIUS accept packet on the AP to which
the client station is associated.
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If WPA with preshared key (PSK) is applied, the PMKwill
be equal to the PSK and the previous phases will be com-
pletely jumped. From this point the server, through the send-
ing of PMK, delegates A to do overall security functions to-
ward S.
Once S and A share PMK, they can complete the authen-
tication phase with the 4-way handshake. This last sub-phase
is the core of the key management scheme of the WPA pro-
tocol. Starting from the common PMK, S and A are able to
obtain the temporary key that is useful for the data encryp-
tion. It is possible to get this temporary key without explic-
itly exchanging it among the sides. The temporary key is one
component of the pairwise transient key (PTK).
Specifically, the first 128 bits of the PTK is called session
“key confirmation key” (KCK), which is used to prove pos-
session of the PMK. The second 128 bits is the session “key
encryption key” (KEK), which is used to distribute the cur-
rent broadcast key. The temporal key is the remaining bits of
the PTK.
Through the 4-way handshake, 802.1X/EAP permits dif-
ferent temporary keys to be obtained for each user, for each
session, and also for each packet. In this way WPA resolves
the security issue of WEP associated with the static keys and
with the manual distribution of these keys among partici-
pants to protect communication; WPA permits configura-
tion parameters to be negotiated, to generate a temporary
key, and to change this key on the packet basis in a secure
manner.
In 2004, the “IEEE Task Group i” released the final ver-
sion of the IEEE 802.11i protocol. Because this protocol is
based on RSNA architecture of WPA and it guarantees back-
ward compatibility with WPA, it is also called WPA2 [6].
The main diﬀerence between WPA and IEEE 802.11i is
the cryptography algorithm applied to data transmission.
WPA uses TKIP (based on RC4), while 802.11i applies a
novel protocol called CCMP (countermode with CBC-MAC
protocol). The latter is based on AES. CCMP represents an
extension of 802.11i because TKIP is still supported but it
needs a change in the hardware architecture. CCMP im-
proves the security level of wireless communication but it
produces computational overhead needing hardware up-
grading and new coprocessors able to manage the cryptog-
raphy processing load in real time. On the contrary TKIP
in WPA can be executed mostly by low-power processors
that are supported in the overall existing APs and, moreover,
TKIP reuses the WEP hardware to oﬄoad most of the com-
putational expenses from the software.
BecauseWPA is light in comparison withWPA2, it better
meets the needs of wireless devices (palmtop or other little
devices) with few available resources. Another characteristic
of WPA against WPA2 is the interoperability between IEEE
802.11b (but not only) and IEEE 802.11i devices. These rea-
sons slow down the migration fromWPA to WPA2.
4. THE 4-WAY HANDSHAKE
In previous sections we have focused on the interesting novel
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Figure 2: The 4-way handshake messages.
where it is possible to generate and dynamically distribute
diﬀerent temporary keys on session, user, and packet basis.
This assures a high robustness against hacker attacks versus
WEP. After 802.1X authentication is completed, 802.11i be-
gins to secure the link by executing the 4-way handshake.
The 802.11i 4-way handshake procedure makes the fol-
lowing steps.
(a) It derives a fresh session key (TKIP).
(b) Through transmission and receiver timers manage-
ment and handshake messages it synchronises its op-
erations.
(c) It distributes a broadcast key from the AP to the sta-
tion.
(d) It verifies that peer is live.
(e) It confirms that peer possesses the station.
(f) It binds the MAC addresses of the station and AP to
this key.
In the 4-way handshake only 4 types of messages are con-
sidered and structured as follows (see Figure 2):
(i) Msg 1: [AA, ANonce, SN, Msg1];
(ii) Msg 2: [SPA, SNonce, SN, Msg2, MIC(SNonce, SN,
Msg2)];
(iii) Msg 3: [AA, ANonce, SN + 1, Msg3, MIC(ANonce,
SN + 1, Msg3)];
(iv) Msg 4: [SPA, SNonce, SN + 1, Msg4, MIC(SNonce,
SN + 1, Msg4)];
where
(1) AA represents the MAC address of AP (A) wireless card;
(2) SPA is the MAC address of S wireless card;
(3) ANonce is a random value generated by A;
(4) SNonce is a random value generated by S;
(5) SN represents the sequence number of the message;
(6) MsgX identifies the type of message X.
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The protocol starts with the generation of a random bits
string called “nonce.” This nonce is generated only once. At
the beginning A generates this nonce (ANonce) and it puts
this one inside the first message (Msg1) sent to S. After re-
ceiving Msg1, S will know AA, SN, and Anonce. These values
can be useful in the generation of PTK. S will produce a novel
nonce called SNonce that will be used with PMK and ANonce
to generate the PTK in the following way:
PTK = PRF (PMK, ANonce, SNonce, AA, SPA), (1)
where PRF is a pseudorandom cryptographic function.
After calculating PTK, S will store ANonce, SNonce, and
PTK and it will send the Msg2 to A. In Msg2 the MIC of
other fields that travel in clear on the wireless channel will be
also inserted. It is important to observe that the MIC value
is calculated through the PTK previously obtained value and
for this reason it is univocally dependent by PTK.
At the reception of Msg2, A has to calculate the novel
PTK with the same procedure adopted by S. It is possible
to calculate the PTK because S, after the reception of Msg2,
knows SNonce. Through the PTK value it is possible to cal-
culate again the MIC value associated with the PTK and to
compare this new value with the MIC inserted in the Msg2.
If MICmsg2 is the same of MIC calculated by A, the sender of
Msg2 is identified and A can be sure to have sent ANonce to
the right node (S) and to share with him the same PMK.
At this phase of the procedure, S and A share PTK and
they have to only give confirmation of the applied sharing
among them. Thus A sends to S the Msg3 (with ANonce
and MIC values) and S and, after verifying the integrity, con-
cludes the handshake with the sending of Msg4.
Moreover, the 4-way handshake provides an asymmetric
scheme of alert as presented below:
(i) if S and A receive a message with invalid SN or MIC
values, they will discard the message; this approach
avoids the “man-in-the-middle” attack [2];
(ii) if S does not receive the Msg1 within a time stamp
(TS), it will disassociate, deauthenticate, and start the
authentication procedure again;
(iii) if A does not receive the Msg2 (or Msg4) within TS, it
will try to send the Msg1 (or Msg3) again; so after k
attempts, it will deassociate S.
This asymmetric behaviour is necessary to avoid deadlock
as shown in Figure 3: if Msg2 is lost before arriving at its
destination and A does not send the Msg1 again, the hand-
shake procedure will terminate without completing its task;
the same issue could happen if A sends Msg1 again but S is
not available to accept Msg1 because it is waiting for Msg3
(Figure 3).
WPA resolves WEP bugs but it does not represent a uni-
versal model of invulnerability. As all session-oriented pro-
tocols, WPA also is sensitive to a specific category of attack.
It is important to observe how WPA in preshared key
mode oﬀers the same key sharing issues as WEP. If the pri-
vacy issues of the key are not considered, it is important to
configure PSK on the AP and on all stations that have to com-























Figure 3: Deadlock situation after packet loss in the case of sym-
metric behaviour.
as PMK in the starting phase of the 4-way handshake, the
overall authentication phase is not executed and only the fi-
nal 4-way handshake is applied. This mechanism does not
oﬀer high security and thus the producers of Wi-Fi suggest
using WPA in preshared key only in the home of the SOHO
environment or in environments where there is a low proba-
bility of attempting attacks on security [8, 9].
During 2002, whenWPA started to appear on themarket,
some important publications denounced the security bugs
of WPA in standard mode (e.g., authentication 802.1X/EAP)
and in PSK mode. These bugs create a lot of problems were
provided. The denounced bugs oﬀer the possibility of trying
attacks such asman-in-the-middle, session hijack, and denial
of service (DoS). The first two types of attacks were possible
only if a one-way authentication was used (e.g., EAP-TLS and
PEAP). The third type consisted of spoofing of 4 types of EAP
protocol messages. So in this case the possibility of hacking
referred to
(i) flooding associate requests or EAOPL-start packets to
AP (even if EAPOL-start messages is not a serious
problem in practice);
(ii) falsifying the EAP-failure messages;
(iii) falsifying the EAP-logoﬀ or disassociate-request mes-
sages;
(iv) falsifying the deauthentication message.
For details of the attack techniques we refer to [2, 9, 10, 19–
21]. All security bugs outlined in 2002, except problems at-
tached to disassociate or deauthenticate requests, have been
avoided in the following release of WPA and in WPA2. In
2003, in order to show the vulnerability of WPA, a solution
was adopted by Moskovitz [22]. However this approach can
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Figure 4: Hacker intrusion after Msg2 forwarding.
be considered a theoretical conjecture and with few chances
to be applied in a real context. This potential attack was
avoided through the adoption of AES-CCMP rather than
RC4-TKIP in WPA2.
Contrary to previous works, in this paper, after a deep
analysis of WPA and WPA2 protocol dynamics attention is
focused on the 4-way handshake procedure and even when
it is used in standard mode (not only in PSK mode). If a
hacker is able to successfully attack the key generation and
distribution process, then the overall security system will be
damaged.
5. DoS AND DoS FLOODING ATTACKS AGAINST
IEEE 802.11i 4-WAY HANDSHAKE
In the current WLAN systems, DoS attacks are very easy to
mount; furthermore, once an adversary successfully mounts
a DoS attack, more advanced attacks, such asMitM [2], could
be subsequently constructed. Therefore, it is necessary to de-
ploy a security mechanism that can defend against DoS at-
tacks. In the following, in accordance with the works [8, 9],
some possible DoS attack scenario is presented.
The weak point of 4-way handshake is represented by the
first message (Msg1). It is the only message that does not use
theMIC field that is very important to guarantee the integrity
and the authenticity of A.
Thus, Msg1 can be falsified and a hacker can easily know
all its fields such as the MAC address, ANonce, SN, and mes-
sage type. We recall, as explained in the previous section,
that S calculates and stores PTK together with ANonce and
Snonce (see formula (1)). Through PTK, S calculates the
MIC to be inserted in Msg2 and sends it to A. After receiving
the Msg2, A calculates its PTK and then MIC. At this point,
hacker (H) can play a role that prepares Msg1 to the mes-
sage similar to that sent from A to S (Figure 4). This new
Msg1′ message diﬀers from Msg1 only in the nonce because
this value is randomly generated locally in the device.
The device S calculates the PTK in the knowledge of
ANonce received with Msg1. Let the value generated by H be
indicated with ANonce′ so that it is possible to discriminate
this from the value created by A (ANonce).
If H is able to send its message (Msg1′) after S sendsMsg2
and before S receives Msg3, S should accept Msg1′ and it will
calculate a novel value PTK that will be indicated by PTK′. In
other terms PTK′ will be a function of PMF, ANonce′, and
SNonce:
PTK′ = PRF (PMF, ANonce′, SNonce, AA, SPA). (2)
The eﬀect produced by the hacker is the storing of two new
values (ANonce′ and PTK′) and the sending of a new mes-
sage (Msg2′) from S to A. This new message will be silently
discarded by A in accordance with the protocol specification.
In this time A will send the message Msg3 to S with its
own ANonce value. After receiving the Msg3, S will notify
a failure in the integrity check because MICPTK = MICPTK′ .
This is due to the PTK′, derived by ANonce′, which produces
a diﬀerent MIC at S. Thus a discarding of Msg3 is produced
without giving any communication to A.
We recall how the silent discarding was appositely intro-
duced by the project manager of WPA in order to avoid at-
tacks such as MITM (man-in-the-middle attack).
After timestamp expiration, the authenticator A, because
it does not receive theMsg4, will sendMsg3 again. This novel
Msg3 will again be discarded by S. After the nth attempt at
transmission and timestamp expiration, A will deauthenti-
cate S and the hacker will achieve his task: to make a DoS
attack [9, 10, 19–21] (Figure 5).
It is important to observe that after each reception of
Msg1, supplicant S stores ANonce and PTK values in its own
station. Thus, if the hacker achieves a multiple attack, it is
possible to achieve a DoS flooding or DoS memory exhaus-
tion attack (such as shown in Figure 6); if the attack is re-
peated through flooding by the hacker, S is forced to store a
lot of ANonce and PTK values producing memory exhaus-
tion. This attack is possible with both WPA and 802.11i pro-
tocols.
On reflection, the standard IEEE 802.11i supports a
mechanism to avoid the modification of PTK on S. This
mechanism forces S to calculate a PTK and a temporary PTK
(TPTK), after receiving the Msg1. In this way S can modify
only the TPTK for each reception of Msg1 and PTK can be
modified only after the reception of Msg3 and the verifica-
tion of its integrity.
This approach resolves the security issue only if the mul-
tiple instances of connection are sequentially executed; in a
scenario such as that previously described, the DoS attack
continues to be applicable because S will calculate its own
MIC through the TPTK value, while the received Msg3 will
carry in a MIC calculated through the PTK value. Thus, be-
cause ANonce is diﬀerent from ANonce′, then PTK = TPTK
and the MIC verification will fail with subsequent Msg3 dis-
carding (Figure 7).
However, the attack is not so easy for the hacker. The
IEEE 802.11i standard supports two mechanisms to reduce
the action range of possible DoS attacks. The first mechanism
uses PMKID in Msg1 and the second mechanism is the link
layer data encryption (LLDE) protocol.
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store ANonce  and PTK 
Calculate PTK  ;
store ANonce   and PTK  
Calculate PTKN ;
store ANonceN and PTKN
Figure 6: DoS flooding attack in 4-way handshake phase.
The PMKID is a further field included in all Msg1 sent
from A to S. It is calculated as follows:
PMKID = SHA (PMK, T), (3)
where T = [“PMK name” ‖AA‖SPA] and SHA is the well-
known one-way hash function SHA-1 at 128 bits. This value
cannot be reproduced by the hacker because he cannot know
the PMK and he cannot think of inverting the hash function.
Thus H cannot send Msg1 to S before A sends its Msg1 oth-
erwise H could be discovered.
Without the PMKID, the DoS flooding attack could be
attempted all the time. Even before sending the Msg1 from A
to S, this attack could be produced by H without becoming
aware of the Msg1.
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Figure 7: DoS attack in 4-way handshake phase with TPTK extension.
LLDE is a mechanism that permits, after having obtained
the PTK from both sides, encryption of the following in-
stances of 4-way handshake. All messages after the first 4
messages (first instance) are encrypted through the tempo-
rary keys of PTK. This approach noticeably reduces the ac-
tion range of the hacker to the first instance.
Thus, the combined action of PMKID and LLDE reduces
the time interval in which the hacker can operate, that is, at
the only first 4-way handshake instance, and after sending the
first Msg1. Even if the action range of a hacker is very small,
the potential risk of DoS attachment is still present. Through
correct devices such as scanners, sniﬀers, and packet gener-
ators, the process can be automatised and synchronised and
the probability of success can be high.
6. STATIC VERSUS DYNAMIC RESOURCE-ORIENTED
SOLUTIONS FOR THE 4-WAY HANDSHAKE
Themain issue in the 4-way handshake procedure is the inca-
pability to discriminate the new Msg1 request coming from
the real node and themessages generated byH. If the capabil-
ity of discrimination is introduced, the handshake procedure
could be completed. The second issue to be overcome is the
memory exhaustion. In fact, even if the hacker’s messages are
discriminated, H could still produce a DoS flooding attack. A
solution to this second issue can be the avoidance of storing
ANonce and PTK for each Msg1 oﬀering the correct work-
ing of the 4-way handshake. At first glance, a further control
field in the frame format could be added but this approach
requires too much change in the original protocol.
In this work a slight change to the terminal is proposed
in order to avoid the deauthentication determined by a DoS
attack andmemory exhaustion after the DoS flooding attack.
6.1. Static standard solution (solution I)
The proposal is easily presented in the following:
(i) on reception of the first message Msg1, S takes 3 ac-
tions, it
(a) generates and stores SNonce;
(b) computes PTK in the same way provided by the
standard protocol;
(c) creates and sends Msg2 (no stores ANonce and
PTK);
(ii) on each reception of a new Msg1, S only calculates
without storing the novel PTK (PTK′); through this
new PTK′ it can produce the MIC value;
(iii) on reception of Msg3, in order to verify the MIC, S
computes the PTK again through the SNonce value
that has previously memorised and the ANonce value
obtained by Msg3; in this way the identification pro-
cess gives a positive response and the attack attempt is
avoided (Figure 8).
The replication ofMsg3 by H is not applicable because in this
message the MIC field that assures the identity is present.
Also memory exhaustion is avoided because it is suﬃ-
cient to store only SNonce rather than ANonce and PTK val-
ues after any reception of Msg1.
With the proposed application we obtain positive results
also in the packet loss scenario. In fact, in the case of Msg2
loss, after timeout, A sends a new Msg1 to S. This message,
calledMsg1′, contains a new ANonce value (ANonce′) which
is now legitimate and so, at the reception of Msg3, it will give
positive response (Figure 9).
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Figure 9: Proposal in packet loss scenario.
However, the proposed solution can occur in a CPU
exhaustion issue rather than memory exhaustion because it
forces the recalculation of PTK for each handshake instance
(e.g., after the reception of Msg3). This should be avoided for
low-power processors.
In this case, it is possible to apply a trade-oﬀ policy be-
tween the standard IEEE 802.11i and the presented proposal.
6.2. Static solution with trade-off variant (solution II)
In particular, the steps to be followed are presented below.
(i) On reception of the first Msg1, S has to perform the
following actions:
(a) generate and store SNonce;
(b) calculate PTK;
(c) create and send Msg2;
(d) store ANonce and PTK.
(ii) On reception of each new message Msg1, S calculates
PTK′ in accordance with the standard proposal.
(iii) After the reception of Msg3, S compares the ANonce
value in Msg3 with the stored ANonce. If the two
ANonce values (ANonce and ANonceMsg3) are the
same, S will verify the MIC of Msg3 using the stored
PTK. Otherwise if the two ANonce values are diﬀerent,
the PTK will be recomputed and after that the MIC
will be verified (Figure 10).
In this way the variant avoids storing ANonce and PTK
(memory exhaustion) each time and recomputing PTK after
each Msg3 arrival (CPU exhaustion).
6.3. Static solution with trade-off variant and
memory release (solution III)
A further change that could be applied to the latter exten-
sion is the deallocation of memory space associated with
SNonce and ANonce storage if S does not receive newMsg1s.
In other terms, if S receives Msg3 after sending Msg2, it can
erase SNonce and ANonce values freeing memory space. At
this point S can verify the MIC values without checking the
ANonce value. This new variant to the proposal should pro-
duce lower performance than the first solution (or standard
proposal) but better performance than trade-oﬀ solution (or
proposal with trade-oﬀ variant) in the no-hacking scenario.
In case of DoS attack the handshake is the same of
the proposal without memory release and so performances
should be the same. In order to test the eﬃcacy and the im-
provement of the proposed solution, a simulation campaign
was conducted as presented in the next section.
Figures 11 and 12 represent the last proposal handshakes
in no-hacking and in DoS attack scenarios.
6.4. Memory and CPU load aware dynamic solution
Through benefits and drawback analysis of three mecha-
nisms for IEEE 802.11i protocol, it is possible to propose a
solution that tries to unify the benefits of the single mech-
anisms. For example, the supplicant could be equipped of
an intelligent software module that monitors system param-
eters (or network parameters) and on their basis it decides
to adopt the mechanism I, II, or III. If the supplicant wants
to control the CPU and memory load levels, threshold levels
could be introduced and if the device overcomes these levels
the system can switch among solution I, II, or III.
Considering the unpredictability of an attacker, both sit-
uations of DoS attack and no-hacking are considered.
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Figure 11: Proposal with trade-oﬀ variant and memory release variant in no-hacking scenario.
As previously explained, the solution I avoids the risk
of memory exhaustion but it can produce an excessive CPU
load.
Thus its usage depends of the device characteristics or de-
vice’s resource availability. On the other hand, solution II re-
duces the CPU load requested by the protocol execution to
oﬀer a good security level. However this solution needs more
memory usage. Thus if the device uses its memory for other
operations or it is limited in the memory, it can be unsuit-
able. The third solution tries to reduce the memory storage
when no-hacking scenario is present. Obviously to use the
solution III, some mechanism to be aware of the no-hacking
scenario should be implemented on the system. This last so-
lution represents a trade-oﬀ of two previous solutions if no
attack is led to the system. The solution I is the best approach
if the device can use a good CPU resource with low mem-
ory storage. The solution II is the optimal solution if limited
memory availability is present and the device needs to avoid
the memory exhaustion issue.
In Table 2, a qualitative evaluation of three solutions with
the possible attacks are considered.
However, we have to observe that the network parame-
ters and resources change in the time and if a static scheme
such as solution I, II, or III could not be the best solution in
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Table 2: Qualitative evaluation of attacks and CPU/mem exaustion risks in three solutions (I, II, and III).
Avoid DoS attack Avoid DoS-F attack
Mem load (risk of
mem exhaustion)
CPU load (risk of
CPU exhaustion)
Solution I
No-hack Scenario Yes Yes — ∗∗
DoS attack scenario Yes Yes — ∗∗∗
Solution II
No-hack scenario Yes Yes ∗ —
DoS attack scenario Yes Yes ∗ ∗
Solution III
No-hack scenario Yes Yes — —
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Figure 12: Proposal with trade-oﬀ and memory release variant in DoS attack scenario.
a time window. This case could be more suitable to adopt a
dynamic approach where solutions I, II, and III can be im-
plemented in the supplicant and they are adopted if some
conditions are verified. Thus it is possible to introduce a con-
troller in the mobile device that continuously checks every X
millisecond the risk threshold levels associated to the CPU or
memory resources. This CPU and memory levels are com-
pared with risk threshold levels that are computed through a
system analysis and that can be given by the device manufac-
turer. For example, it is possible for the supplicant to start the
4-way handshake following the solution I. However if some
risk threshold is overcome, it can switch in the other modal-
ities (solution II or III). In Table 3 the switching scenario for
CPU and memory loads is presented.
For example, if at time t1 a sensible increase of CPU load
is observed, the device will adopt the 4-way handshake of so-
lution II and it will keep this solution also if an overcome of
the memory load threshold is verified under DoS attack. Af-
ter the attack, if the warning levels of the device are under the
alert values, it is unuseful to waste memory and it is possible
Table 3: Choice of suitable solution under normal and high CPU




















to switch to the solution III. Then, if the CPU or memory
load goes under the risk threshold values, solution II or I can
be adopted. Flowchart diagram and pseudocode for the dy-
namic 4-way handshake policy are introduced (see Figure 13
and Algorithm 1).
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START
Normal CPU load
High mem load & DoS attack
High CPU load
High mem load
High mem load &
high CPU load & no attack
High mem load /
no attack
Normal CPU load
Normal mem load or
(high mem load & DoS attack)
Figure 13: Flowchart diagram of the dynamic resource-oriented
approach.
In the pseudocode presented below (see Algorithm 1),
it is possible to understand the resource-oriented switching
policy among the three solutions. Two thresholds are con-
sidered (mem and CPU thresholds). For example, in the ex-
ample below they are fixed to 100. Two variables (memLoad
and cpuLoad) need to be used in order to account the cur-
rent resource usage. Two functions (readCPUload and read-
MEMload) are applied to get the current resource availability
values.
7. FSA MODELLING
In this paragraph we will attempt to create a mathematical
model that can summarise what has been dealt with discur-
sively up to now. The aim is to arrive systematically at the
simulation phase, where for “simulation” is intended the em-
ulation of the real system through a preliminary study of the
mathematical model representing the system.
The finite state automa (FSA) can therefore provide an
optimummodel with which to point out the important char-
acteristics of the 4-way handshake protocol and from which
to begin a discrete simulation, through java “actors,” of the
working of the said protocol.
Specifically, since the simulation phase sets the objective
of testing the speculative theories formulated in the previous
paragraph, the modelling will deal with both the dynamics of
the WPA protocol as it is today (obviously with the necessary
simplifications already seen) and those of how it would be
with the proposed changes (general proposal, compromise
proposal, and compromise proposal with variant).
For each of the cases there should be three-orientated
graphs: one for the supplicant, one for the authenticator, and
one for the hacker.
In reality, since the proposed changes only aﬀect the
client’s behaviour, it is felt unnecessary to repeat the identical






















Figure 15: FSA of supplicant in WPA protocol.
To facilitate understanding of the automa refer to Figures
15, 16, 17, and 18.
Before implementing the simulation program, a finite
state automata (FSA) formalism was applied to define the
entities involved in the communication process and to simu-
late the actions of possible attackers (e.g., hackers). The FSA
are used to outline the characteristics of the 4-way hand-
shake protocols. Specifically, a supplicant, authenticator, and
hacker FSA are defined. In this paper, the FSA and their ac-
tions are presented.
To formalise the actions carried out by the automa we
will use the following notations (see Figure 14):
(i) actionAS: action eﬀected by A before sending Msg1;
(ii) actionS1: action eﬀected by S immediately after the re-
ception of Msg1;
(iii) actionA2: action eﬀected by A after the reception of
Msg2;
(iv) actionS3: action eﬀected by S after the reception of
Msg3.
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const MEM thershold = 100;











if (cpuLoad > CPU threshold)











if ((memLoad >MEM threshold) AND (attack = false))
goto3;









if ((memLoad ≤MEM threshold) OR ((memLoad >MEM threshold) AND (attack = true)))
goto2;






At this point the automa of the supplicant, authenticator,
and hacker can be represented, along with their respective
semantic tables.
Each automa should be read in the following way:
(i) if S is in the CREATED state (starting state) and re-
ceives an “init”-type signal, then it carries out action
SI and immediately after that it passes to the INITED
state;
(ii) if S is in the INITED state and receives a message of the
“start”-type, then it eﬀects the actionSS and passes to
the STATER1 state;
(iii) if S is in state STATER1 and receives a “Msg1”-type
message, then it carries out the actionSS and passes to
the STATER2 state;
and so on. For example, for the FSA of the supplicant, see
Figure 15; for the authenticator and the hacker see Figures
16 and 17. The actions are outlined in Tables 4–6.
The actions are outlined in Table 4.
In the same way, following the semantic table of the ac-
tions, also the automa relative to A represented below is self-
explanatory.











Timeout & count <= k/
actionAT2
Timeout & count <= k/
actionAT3
Timeout & count <= k/
actionAT1
Timeout & count > k/
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Figure 17: FSA of hacker in WPA protocol.
The automa of hacker H is the most linear since it re-
flects the ease with which it can mechanically sniﬀ the com-
munication between S and A and introduce itself at a suitable
moment (after the sending of Msg2) to carry out the attack
(actionH2).
Now let us see how the actions of S and A change them-
selves according to what is introduced by the 3 proposals pre-
sented (Tables 7–9).
The FSA are not shown because they have the same states
















Without attack With attack With 10 attacks
Mem load 948.9 1582.46 7284.5
Time exec 110 20129 20449
CPU load 2674.97 4485.19 23371.42
Figure 18: WPA protocol performance in no-hacking, DoS attack,
and DoS flooding attack scenarios.
Table 4: Actions of supplicant FSA.
ActionSI Associate a specific A to S
ActionSS NOP (no operation)
ActionS1









(i) if positive ACK is verified, send Msg4,
(ii) otherwise, NOP
ActionSR Send resume
Table 5: Actions of authenticator FSA.
ActionAI Association of a specific S to A
ActionAS
















Start of the timer
ActionAT2 NOP
ActionAT3
A new forwarding of Msg3
The timer starts
ActionAR Print results
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Table 6: Actions of hacker FSA.
ActionHI Associate a specific S to A
ActionHS NOP (no operation)
ActionH1 Store AA and SN
ActionH2 Generate ANonce′ and send Msg1′
Table 7: Actions of supplicant FSA of static standard solution.
ActionSI Associate to S a specific A
ActionSS NOP (no operation)
ActionS1
Generate and store SNonce
Calculate PTK








(i) If positive verification, send Msg4;
(ii) otherwise, NOP;
ActionSR Send resume
Table 8: Actions of supplicant FSA of static solution with trade-oﬀ
variant.
ActionSI Associate a specific A to S
ActionSS NOP (no operation)
ActionS1
Generate and store SNonce
Calculate PTK






If ANonce =Msg3. ANonce verify MIC,









After the definition of the FSA, a discrete event simulator was
built in JAVA ver.1.4.2 in order to verify the benefits and the
drawbacks of the proposed approach.
Starting therefore from an ASF model the code of the
simulazione∗.java file was designed, with which the suppli-
cant, authenticator, and hacker classes were implemented by
means of technique and “actors.”
Table 9: Actions of supplicant FSA of static solution with memory
release.
ActionSI Associate a specific A to S
ActionSS NOP (no operation)
ActionS1
Generate and store SNonce
Calculate PTK







If ArrivedMsg1′ = FALSE, then
Release ANonce and SNonce,
Verify MIC,
(i) if positive ack, send Msg4,
(ii) otherwise, NOP
Else
if ANonce =Msg3. Anonce, then
Verify MIC,





(i) if positive ack send Msg4;
(ii) otherwise, NOP
ActionSR Send resume
The dynamic behaviour of the three actors was simulated
in 4 diﬀerent protocol architectures: standard WPA/IEEE
802.11i protocol, other three static solutions (solution I, II,
and III). Then, a comparison between static solutions and
dynamic resource-oriented approach (solution IV) has been
carried out.
8.1. Simulation scenario and parameters
The simulation task is the performance evaluation of the 4-
way handshake of WPA and IEEE 802.11i in the case of DoS
attack like the scenario defined in Section 5.
The simulation parameters are
(i) attack result: it represents the number of completed at-
tacks towards the mobile devices;
(ii) memory load:1 it represents the cost associated to the
memory consumption;
(iii) CPU load:1 it represents the cost associated to the CPU
usage;
(iv) execution time: it is the time necessary to complete the
4-way handshake procedure.
1 Client-side. (In our simulation the server-side memory and CPU load has
also been calculated, but only the supplicant performances are presented
in this work.) Computational time is expressed in milliseconds.
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Table 10: Costs (mem and CPU loads) associated to the 4-way
handshake operations.
Cost associated to the storage (mem load) and
computation (CPU load)
Value
Nonce cost associated with memory storage 315
PTK cost associated with the memory storage 318
MIC cost associated with the CPU operations 288
PTK cost associated with the CPU operations 1810
There are 12 possible cases that are implemented and they
are described below.
(i) Standard protocol (WPA/IEEE 802.11i) without at-
tack, WPA/IEEE802.11i with DoS attack, and WPA/
IEEE 802.11i with DoS flooding attack.
(ii) Solution I without attack, with DoS attack, and with
DoS flooding attack.
(iii) Solution II without attack, with DoS attack, and with
DoS flooding attack.
(iv) Solution III without attack, with DoS attack, and with
DoS flooding attack.
The simulation parameters adopted in our environment
are presented in Table 10.
Also if the value above has been arbitrarily chosen, the
approach has a general validity because the cost associated
with the CPU and memory consumption need to be referred
to the availability of memory and CPU. This availability can
change in a mobile device depending on the other opera-
tions that device is performing. Thus it is important to fo-
cus on the possibility to reduce the resource availability for
a prefixed cost associated with CPU or memory storage op-
erations. In order to validate proposals, simulation data are
represented in histograms.
Specifically, with reference tomodelling bymeans of FSA,
it is easy to understand that the critical operations which
aﬀect performances of the client-side protocol are without
doubt “actionS1,” “actionS3,” and “actionS11;” in these in
fact the greatest memory and CPU loads occur.
8.2. Simulation results
Simulation results depicted in Figure 18 show the perfor-
mance of the WPA/IEEE 802.11i standard protocol. It is
possible to observe the positive result of both DoS attacks
(simple DoS and DoS flooding) and the consequent system
degradation in terms of memory and CPU loads: the mem-
ory load doubles in DoS attack case and it is 8 times the ini-
tial memory load in the case of a DoS flooding attack (with
10 flooding messages); the execution time changes from 110
milliseconds (with no attack) to 20000 milliseconds in the
DoS attack scenario and this is reputable to the positive re-
sult of the attack.
As can be seen in Figure 19, the solution I presents a bet-
ter performance than standard protocol (WPA/IEEE 802.11i)
in terms of memory load with and without attacks. The
















Without attack With attack With 10 attacks
Mem load 315.34 315.34 315.34
Time exec 110 140 270
CPU load 4485.19 6583.66 25469.89
Figure 19: Solution I performance in no-hacking, DoS attack, and
















Without attack With attack With 10 attacks
Mem load 948.9 948.9 948.9
Time exec 110 131 250
CPU load 2674.97 4773.44 23659.67
Figure 20: Performance of trade-oﬀ solution (solution II) in no-
hacking, DoS attack, and DoS flooding attack scenarios.
operations that S eﬀects are similar. Good improvements can
be verified also for the execution time in the case of intru-
sion because DoS attack and DoS flooding attack are now
avoided. However, the CPU load values increase as shown in
Figure 19 and as outlined in the previous section.
Thus, in order to avoid CPU exhaustion in the case where
the hacker can attempt DoS flooding attacks with a high rate,
trade-oﬀ (solution II) is considered and simulation results
are presented in Figure 20.
Memory consumption is lower than the standard pro-
posal in the hacking scenario and the CPU load is maintained
low as in the standard WPA/IEEE 802.11i protocol.
In other terms, the proposal with trade-oﬀ variant oﬀers
the following advantages:
(i) DoS attack and DoS flooding attack are avoided;
(ii) CPU load equals that of the WPA/IEEE 802.11i stan-
dard 4-way handshake;
(iii) memory load independent of attack type;
(iv) execution time similar to that of standard proposal.
However, solution II does not make a distinction in the
memory occupation if the device is under attack or if no at-
tack is present. This suggested a variant to solution II should
be proposed that consists in the memory release if no-attack
scenario is considered. This kind of situation can be detected
















Without attack With attack With 10 attacks
Mem load 318.21 948.9 948.9
Time exec 141 140 271
CPU load 2674.97 4773.44 23659.67
Figure 21: Performance of trade-oﬀ with memory release solution





0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000
Exec time CPU load Mem load
Standard protocol 110 2674.67 948.9
Solution I 110 4485.19 315.34
Solution II 110 2674.97 948.9
Solution III 141 2674.97 318.21
Figure 22: Standard protocol simulation parameter values, stan-
dard proposal simulation values, trade-oﬀ proposal, and trade-oﬀ
with memory release variant proposal simulation values in a no-
hacking scenario.
by the mobile device after a monitoring of the 4-way hand-
shake procedure. If the previous handshake procedure had
been executed without observing malicious messages for a
certain amount of time, the risk threshold of the device can
be reduced and a no-attack scenario can be considered. The
threshold setting and the no-attack scenario evaluation are
outside the scope of this paper. Anyway, through this con-
sideration, further advantages oﬀered by proposed solution
III can be verified in a lower memory load in the no-hacking
scenario such as the one depicted in Figure 21. The other pa-
rameters reflect the same performance as the trade-oﬀ pro-
posal without memory release.
Thus, the previous graphics above, permit quantification
of the CPU load, memory load, and 4-way handshake execu-
tion time when the three solutions (I, II, and III) are adopted.
Now, in Figures 22, 23, and 24 data have been reelabo-
rated in order to give a more complete picture of parame-
ter values related to the standard WPA/IEEE 802.11i proto-
col, the standard proposal (solution I), the trade-oﬀ proposal
(solution II), and the trade-oﬀ with memory release variant
proposal in no-hacking scenarios (solution III).
In Figure 22 where no-hacking scenario is considered,
if the most important resource to be considered is the




0 5000 10000 15000 20000
Standard protocol 20129 4485.19 1582.46
Solution I 140 6583.66 315.34
Solution II 131 4773.44 948.9
Solution III
Figure 23: Simulation parameter values of standard protocol, stan-
dard proposal, trade-oﬀ proposal, and trade-oﬀ proposal with




0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000
Time exec CPU load Mem load
Standard protocol 20449 23371.42 7284.5
Solution I 270 25469.89 315.34
Solution II 250 23659.67 948.9
Solution III 271 23659.67 948.9
Figure 24: Simulation parameter values of standard protocol, stan-
dard proposal, trade-oﬀ proposal, and trade-oﬀ with memory re-
lease variant proposal in a DoS flooding attack scenario.
of WPA/IEEE 802.11 protocol without the He and Mitchell
extension (solution I). On the other hand, if the memory
load is considered the most important, solution I and so-
lution III perform better. If we have a wide resource avail-
ability, and the execution time can be important, WPA/IEEE
802.11i without enhancements, solutions I, and II are the
best. Obviously the WPA/IEEE 802.11i protocol without He
and Mitchell extension can not be considered because the
system would be weak to a DoS attack. Thus, a DoS attack
and DoS flooding attacks have been simulated and their ef-
fects have been depicted in Figure 23. Also in this case, de-
pending on the importance given to resources consumption,
in some case solution I can be the best or some times solution
II or solution III.
In this way, simulation campaigns, suggest that we should
propose a dynamic approach such as that explained in
Section 6 that tries to combine these distinct solutions. Just
to give an idea of the improvements introduced by the dy-
namic approach, a graph, where DoS attack is considered,
with the static and dynamic resource-oriented approaches
is shown in Figure 25. In this case, solution IV oﬀers the
best performance in terms of mem load and execution time
maintaining a low CPU load (comparable with solutions
II and III).




0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000
Time exec CPU load Mem load
Solution IV 134 5012 340.23
Solution III 140 4773.44 948.9
Solution II 131 4773.44 948.9
Solution I 140 6583.66 315.34
Figure 25: Simulation parameter values of static solutions (I, II, and
III) and dynamic solution (IV) in a DoS flooding attack scenario.
9. CONCLUSIONS
Two well-known security protocols WPA and IEEE 802.11i
are evaluated.WPA and IEEE 802.11i are robust to a lot of at-
tacks and they overcome the security bugs of WEP protocol.
However, in some specific scenarios, these protocols are not
able to avoid a DoS attack. After defining the potential risk
situation, which can occur in the last phase of the authenti-
cation process (the 4-way handshake), three static solutions
that avoid the attack and realise diﬀerent CPU and memory
consumptions are investigated and evaluated through simu-
lations. Simulation results validate the proposal to enhance
the WPA protocol and avoid a DoS attack and DoS flood-
ing attack. However, eﬃciency in terms of CPU load and
memory exhaustion depends on the specific adopted solu-
tion. Specifically, we suggest to adopt a dynamic resource-
oriented approach that tries to get the best behaviour of the
three distinct solutions. This mechanism is based on CPU
andmemory load thresholds and it can meet the diﬀerent re-
source availabilities of mobile devices during the data trans-
mission.
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